Epistemic Schmagency?

Constructivist approaches in epistemology and ethics offer a promising account of normativity. But constructivism faces a powerful Schmagency Objection, raised by David Enoch. While Enoch’s objection has been widely discussed in the context of practical norms, no one has yet explored how the Schmagency Objection might undermine epistemic constructivism. In this paper, I rectify that gap. First, I develop the objection against a prominent form of epistemic constructivism, Belief Constitutivism. Belief Constitutivism is susceptible to a Schmagency Objection, I argue, because it locates the source of normativity in the belief rather than the agent. In the final section, I propose a version of epistemic constructivism that locates epistemic normativity as constitutive of agency. I argue that this version has the resources to respond to the Schmagency Objection

Unusual Presentation of Gastric Perforation by Foreign Body: A Case Report

Perforation of the gastrointestinal tract by ingested foreign body is rare. The majority of patients do not recall ingestion of the foreign body, and dietary foreign bodies are most commonly involved. We present an interesting case where the offending foreign body gave rise to a diagnostic dilemma masquerading as a pancreatic mass. A high index of suspicion is indicated especially when dealing with atypical presentation and nonspecific symptoms as highlighted in this case

Just war and military morale: a brief reflection on the correlation between the legality of war and the moral repercussions for members of US and UK forces arising from the questionable legality of the campaign Iraqi Freedom of March 2003

Does it matter to a member of the military whether the military campaign in which he is taking part is lawful or not? Despite the observation that the crime of aggression (post Kampala 2010) constitutes a ‘leadership crime par excellence,’ which limits any (future) criminal responsibility accordingly, the legality or illegality of any military action under international law can create moral implications for the common foot soldier and mid-level officer and also have a tangible impact on the national legal frameworks under which these forces operate. This short article uses the example of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003) to discuss the repercussions of a—most likely—illegal military campaign for individual members of democratic armed forces before the background of the present discussion of NATO led action in Libya

'Dressage Is Full of Queens!' Masculinity, Sexuality and Equestrian Sport

Attitudes towards sexuality are changing and levels of cultural homophobia decreasing, yet there remain very few openly gay men within sport. As a proving ground for heteromasculinity, sport has traditionally been a hostile environment for gay men. This article is based on an ethnographic study within a sporting subworld in which gay men do appear to be accepted: equestrian sport. Drawing on inclusive masculinity theory, equestrian sport is shown to offer an unusually tolerant environment for gay men in which heterosexual men of all ages demonstrate low levels of homophobia. Inclusive masculinity theory is a useful framework for exploring the changing nature of masculinities and this study demonstrates that gay men are becoming increasingly visible and accepted within once unreceptive locales, such as sport and rural communities. However, this more tolerant attitude is purchased at the expense of a subordinated feminine Other, perpetuating the dominance of men within competitive sport. © The Author(s) 2012

Rational Moral Ignorance

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView

How Reasoning Aims at Truth

Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary dispositions, is capable of fully explaining its own exercises. I argue that this account is able to avoid the difficulties plaguing standard accounts of the relevant sort of mental teleology

Immorality and Irrationality

Does immorality necessarily involve irrationality? The question is often taken to be among the deepest in moral philosophy. But apparently deep questions sometimes admit of deflationary answers. In this case we can make way for a deflationary answer by appealing to dualism about rationality, according to which there are two fundamentally distinct notions of rationality: structural rationality and substantive rationality. I have defended dualism elsewhere. Here, I’ll argue that it allows us to embrace a sensible – I will not say boring – moderate view about the relationship between immorality and irrationality: roughly, that immorality involves substantive irrationality, but not structural irrationality. I defend this moderate view, and argue that many of the arguments for less moderate views turn either on missing the distinction between substantive and structural rationality, or on misconstruing it

Modeling of Wnt-mediated tissue patterning in vertebrate embryogenesis

During embryogenesis, morphogens form a concentration gradient in responsive tissue, which is then translated into a spatial cellular pattern. The mechanisms by which morphogens spread through a tissue to establish such a morphogenetic field remain elusive. Here, we investigate by mutually complementary simulations and in vivo experiments how Wnt morphogen transport by cytonemes differs from typically assumed diffusion-based transport for patterning of highly dynamic tissue such as the neural plate in zebrafish. Stochasticity strongly influences fate acquisition at the single cell level and results in fluctuating boundaries between pattern regions. Stable patterning can be achieved by sorting through concentration dependent cell migration and apoptosis, independent of the morphogen transport mechanism. We show that Wnt transport by cytonemes achieves distinct Wnt thresholds for the brain primordia earlier compared with diffusion-based transport. We conclude that a cytoneme-mediated morphogen transport together with directed cell sorting is a potentially favored mechanism to establish morphogen gradients in rapidly expanding developmental systems

Normative Alethic Pluralism

Some philosophers have argued that truth is a norm of judgement and have provided a variety of formulations of this general thesis. In this paper, I shall side with these philosophers and assume that truth is a norm of judgement. What I am primarily interested in here are two core questions concerning the judgement-truth norm: (i) what are the normative relationships between truth and judgement? And (ii) do these relationships vary or are they constant? I argue for a pluralist picture—what I call Normative Alethic Pluralism (NAP)—according to which (i) there is more than one correct judgement-truth norm and (ii) the normative relationships between truth and judgement vary in relation to the subject matter of the judgement. By means of a comparative analysis of disagreement in three areas of the evaluative domain—refined aesthetics, basic taste and morality—I show that there is an important variability in the normative significance of disagreement—I call this the variability conjecture. By presenting a variation of Lynch’s scope problem for alethic monism, I argue that a monistic approach to the normative function of truth is unable to vindicate the conjecture. I then argue that normative alethic pluralism provides us with a promising model to account for it

Blind Rule-Following and the Regress of Motivations

Normativists about belief hold that belief formation is essentially rule- or norm-guided. On this view, certain norms are constitutive of or essential to belief in such a way that no mental state not guided by those norms counts as a belief, properly construed. In recent influential work, Kathrin Glüer and Åsa Wikforss develop novel arguments against normativism. According to their regress of motivations argument, not all belief formation can be rule- or norm-guided, on pain of a vicious infinite regress. I argue that the regress of motivations argument is unsuccessful: an appeal to the notion of blind rule-following, drawn from a plausible interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following, stops the regress of motivations in its tracks